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resumo O controlo de acesso é um aspecto sensível e crucial quando se fala de 
proteger dados presentes em base de dados. Em aplicações que 
assentam numa base de dados baseadas em expressões Creafe, Read, 
Update e Delefe (CRUD) , os utilizadores podem executar uma ou uma 
sequência de expressões CRUD para obter um dado resultado. Neste 
tipo de aplicações o controlo de acesso não é limitado apenas a autorizar 
o acesso a um objecto por um sujeito, mas também a autorizar e validar 
as operações que o sujeito pode fazer sobre os dados depois de obter 
autorização. Os modelos atuais de controlo de acesso geralmente focam- 
se em restringir o acesso aos recursos CRUD a CRUD. No entanto, logo 
que o sujeito é autorizado, não há restrições sob as ações que este pode 
efetuar sobre esses recursos. Neste trabalho é apresentado um modelo 
de controlo de acesso que extende as funcionalidades dos modelos de 
controlo de acesso atuais para fornecer um ambiente onde um conjunto 
de politicas predefinidas são implementadas como grafos de expressões 
CRUD. Estes grafos de expressões CRUD são considerados como 
sequências que atuam como politicas guardadas e preconfiguradas. O 
design das sequências é baseado nas operações que o utilizador deseja 
efetuar para obter um dado resultado. Estas sequências de expressões 
CRUD são assim usadas para controlar e validar as ações que podem 
ser efetuadas sobre a informação armazenada. De forma a reusar estas 
políticas, o modelo apresentado define o uso de execuçao externa de 
políticas configuradas. O objetivo do trabalho nesta tese é fornecer uma 
estrutura que permite aos utilizadores de aplicações apenas executarem 
sequências autorizadas de expressões CRUD numa ordem predefinida e 
permitir aos administradores de sistema de desenharem politicas de uma 
forma flexível através de estruturas de grafos. Como prova de conceito, o 
modelo Role Based Access Control (RBAC) foi tido como referência para 
o modelo de controlo de acesso e para a base deste trabalho foi 
escolhido o S-DRACA que permite sequências de expressões CRUD de 
serem executadas por ordem. 
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Access Control is a sensitive and crucial aspect when it comes to 
securing the data present in the databases. In an application which is 
driven by Create, Read, Update and Delete (CRUD) expressions, users 
can execute a single CRUD expression or a sequence of CRUD 
expressions to achieve the desired results. In such type of applications, 
the Access Control is not just Iimited to authorizing the subject for 
accessing the object, but it also aims to authorize and validate the 
operations that a subject can perform on the data after the authorization. 
Current Access Control models are generally concerned with restricting 
the access to the resources. However, once the subject is authorized, 
there are no restrictions on the actions a subject can perform on the 
resources. In this work an Access Control Model has been presented 
which extends current Access Control model's features to provide an 
environment where a set of predefined policies are implemented as 
graphs of CRUD expressions. The design of the access control policies 
is based on the CRUD expressions that a user needs to execute to 
complete a task. These graphs of CRUD expressions are hence used 
for controlling and validating the actions that can be performed on 
authorized information. In order to reuse the policies, presented model 
allows the inter execution of the policies based on some predefined 
rules. The aim of the present thesis work is to provide a structure which 
allows the application users to only execute the authorized sequences 
of CRUD expressions in a predefined order and allows the security 
experts to design the policies in a flexible way through the graph data 
structure. As a proof of concept, Role based Access Control model 
(RBAC) has been taken as a reference access control model and the 
base for this work is chosen as Secured, Distributed and Dynamic 
RBAC (S-DRACA) which allowed the sequence of CRUD expressions to 
be executed in single direction. 
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I Introduction 
Privacy, security and trust are crucial for any application, service and transaction 
offered over a public communications network, such as the Internet (Rodica 
Tirtea,201 l).The evolution of today's business and technical world are imposing growing 
demands for flexibility, efficiency, availability and reliability of information upon database 
applications. The needs and demands of the current business environment are leading us 
to a scenario where reliability and availability of information from various sources is a 
crucial issue. In every genera of business processing, storing and securing the information 
are the most crucial and important tasks in hand. Current business world forces limits to 
maintain a balance between the securing the valuable information and providing an ease 
for accessing this stored information. Security Managers design policies which are a 
collection of principles and rules that describe how an organization intends to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its systems and the information that they 
process(Caulfield,2015). 
An important requirement of any information management system is to protect data 
and resources against unauthorized disclosure (secrecy) and unauthorized or improper 
modifications (integrity), while at the same time ensuring their availability to legitimate 
users (no denials-of-service). Enforcing protection therefore requires that every access to 
a system and its resources be controlled and that all and only authorized accesses can 
take place. This process goes under the name of access control (Pierangela Samarati, 
2001). 
In today's technology oriented worlds, hundreds of applications access the database 
either for reading the stored information, modifying existing information, deleting the 
unwanted information or for inserting new information. These operations are termed as 
CRUD expressions (Create, Read, Update, and Delete) which symbolises the Insert, 
Select, Update and Delete operation on the databases. Providing a secured environment 
where users can execute the CRUD expressions without violating the security policies has 
always been a challenge to the security experts. Security experts implement the access 
control models in an organization by determining the allowed activities of legitimate users, 
mediating every attempt by a user to access a resource in the system(Vincent C. Hu, 
2006). Access Control Policies are designed to act as rules for allowing only legitimate 
users to execute the CRUD expressions on the information which they are allowed to 
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access. Designing the access control policies depend on the model to be implemented in 
an organization and on the level at which it will be implemented (ROGER NEEDHAM, 
2008). 
Ordering the execution of CRUD expression is required where the execution of a 
CRUD expression depends on the result of the execution of another CRUD expression. 
To understand the importante of the ordering of the executions of CRUD expressions 
consider the example of a bank application for transferring money from one account to 
other. Figure 1 shows SQL table of the current amount of money a client has in his 
account and Figure 2 shows the SQL table for maintaining the information of the 
transactions a user performs. 
inf 
Figure 1 : SQL table for Client's Balance 
In the table shown in Figure 2 the client can only transfers the money into the 
account of another client if the amount that he desires to transfer is less than or equal to 
the balance he has in table shown in Figure 1. 
Column Name Data Type 
- - 
..................................................................... i Transa int 
. ................... 
Figure 2: SQL table for transactions carried out by the client 
To implement the logic of transferring the money from one account to another 
Figure 3 shows a piece of java code that implements a method that will take the ids of the 
two clients and the amount that the client wants to transfer as parameters and períorms 
the operation of transfer if the balance in client's account is more than or equal to the 
money he is willing to transfer. 
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public void transferlbneyTo(int ClientID, String Client2 - IBAN, float amount Transfer) 
- 
throws SQLException { 
float balance; 
PreparedStatement ps = conn.prepareStatement("Se1ect Current - Bclance 
t "from Client - Information where Client ID=@idn); 
- 
ps . setInt (1, ClientID) ; 
ResultSet rs = ps.executeQuery0 ; 
balance = rs.getFloat ("Balance") ; 
if (balance > amount - Transfer) { 
ps= conn.prepareStatement (" insert into Client - Transaction (Clientl ID, Transacted ValueR 
- - 
t "Client2 - IBAN) Values (tidl, @money, I @Ibanl I ")  ; 
ps. setInt (1, ClientID) ; 
ps. setfloat (2, amount - Transfer) ; 
ps. setstring (3, Client2 - IBAN) ; 
ps . executeüpdate ( ) ; 
} else { 
System.out.println("Not enough fundç, your current balance is  "+balance); 
1 
1 
Figure 3 Java code implementing the transfer method 
In this situation the select query for getting the balance of the client has to be 
exewted first as the application needs to check the balance of the client before making a 
transfer. In this situation if the order of the execution of CRUD expressions is changed, 
then the transfer will be made without considering the fact that client can have his balance 
less than the amount he is willing to transfer. Hence we can see that if the order of these 
two queries is changed the result will be the vety diíferent from what is being desired. 
Therefore we can conclude that, in systems where the execution of the CRUD expression 
of one state lead to another state, order of the exewtion of CRUD expressions is very 
important. In the example shown in Figure 3, execution of the select took the system to a 
state where the decision of making a transfer isto be done. 
Current popular access control models such as RBAC, DAC, MAC provides 
complete access to data after the user is successfully authenticated (Pierangela Samarati, 
2001), but they lack in providing a control over the execution of the authorized CRUD 
expressions that authenticated user can perform on the information source (Ausanka- 
Crues, 2006). This means that once a user is granted permission to access the secured 
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information, he is able to perform authorized operations in any order as desired by him. 
Consider the example depicted by Figure 3, if there is no control on the order of the 
execution of the CRUD expressions then the application can execute the insert query 
before the select query which will lead to a failure and hence an exception will be thrown. 
In critical database applications where the system is growing in size and complexity, 
users executes the sequences of CRUD expression to achieve a particular goal. These 
sequences either comprise of a list of CRUD expression or a single CRUD to complete a 
task in hand. In such applications, the access control has to be maintained at sequence 
level instead of controlling the execution of each CRUD individually, as the successful 
execution of the sequence results in achieving the goal. Example shown in Figure 3 
illustrates the importante of controlling the execution of the sequence rather than 
controlling the execution of the CRUD. 
To overcome this security gap, we provide a structure where an access control 
policy can be designed as a directed graph of CRUD expressions for validating the 
actions performed by an authenticated user. This directed graph of CRUD expressions is 
regarded as policy graph. 
Reusing a piece of code written for a specific task is very powerful feature of many 
programming languages such as Java, C#, php etc. Figure 4 shows an example where 
getClientBalance0 gets the balance of the client using the SQL select. The access control 
policy designed for this method will only allow the execution of the select query. Figure 5 
shows a modified version of the java code shown in Figure 3, here the method 
getClientBalance0 is being called to execute the select query. Figure 6 shows another 
method to deposit money into a client's account using the same function shown by 
Figure 4. 
To design the access control policy that validates the execution of sequence of 
CRUD expressions shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 we need to use the access control 
policy designed for the execution of sequence of CRUD expressions for 
getClientBalance0 shown in Figure 4. Therefore the policy designed for validating the 
select query shown in Figure 4 is used by the policies designed for validating the 
respected insert and update queries. 
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p u b l i c  f l o a t  getCl ientBalanae(int  Cl ientID) throws SQLException { 
f l o a t  balance; 
Preparedstatement ps = conn.prepareStatement("Se1ect Balance " 
+ "from Client Information where Client ID=@idW); 
- - 
ps . s e t I n t  (1, ~ l i e n t ~ ~ )  ; 
ResultSet r s  = ps.executeQuery(); 
balance = rs .getFloat ("Balarice'l) ; 
r e t u r n  balance; 
Figure 4: java code for getting the balance of a client 
If we wnsider designing a single policy graph to wntrol the order of execution of the 
CRUD expressions present in the methods of tmnsfemng and depositing money, then we 
eliminate the possibility of reusing the policies. Therefore if policy is designed just to 
support the CRUD expressions for getClientBalance(), then it can be reused by the 
policies designed to support tmnsferMoneyTo() and depositMoney0. Hence security 
manager can reuse the designed policies in difíerent scenarios. 
public void transferlbneflo(int ClientID, String Client2 - IBAN, float amount - Transfer) 
throws SQLException { 
float balance; 
PreparedStatement ps; 
balance = getClientBalance (Client~~) ; 
if (balance > amount - Transfer) { 
ps = conn.prepareStatement (I' insert into Client - Transaction(Client1 ID," 
- 
+ "Transacted - Value" 
+ "Client2 - IBAN) Values ( @ i d l ,  @money, ' @Ibanl) 'I) ; 
ps . setInt (1, ClientID) ; 
ps . setFloat (2, amount - Transfer) ; 
ps. setString (3, ~lient2 -IBAN) ; 
ps . executeupdate ( ) ; 
} else { 
System. out .println ("~ot enough funds, your current balance is " t balance) ; 
1 
1 
Figure 5: Modified java code for Figure 3 
5 
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public void depositbáoney ( i n t  ' r V l i e n t ~ ~ ,  f l o a t  arnount) throws SQ~Exception { 
f l o a t  balance; 
balance=getClientBalance (ClientID) ; 
balance=balance+arnount ; 
PreparedStaternent ps= conn.prepareStaternent ("Update Cl ient  - Information 
f "set Current Balance=@balcnce " 
t "where Cl ient  - ID=@id ") ; 
ps . setFloat  (1, balance) ; 
ps . s e t I n t  (2 ,  ClientID) ; 
ps . execu tepda te  ( )  ; 
Figure 6 : java code using method shown in Figure4 for deposit 
Figure 5 shows the method transferMoneyTo() which uses the result of the select 
query to make the decision of next query to be executed. So, the result of the select query 
will decide in which state the system will enter: either it will enter into the state where the 
money is transferred or it will te11 the client that he has insufficient funds. The scenarios 
where execution of a CRUD decides the state that the system will enter requires access 
control policies that should limit the user to execute only the CRUD expressions which are 
allowed in resulting state. Design of such access control policies can map the 
implementation of the applications to the designing of the policies. 
In database applications the sequence of CRUD expressions are designed to 
achieve a goal (Óscar Mortágua Pereira, 2014). The execution of the sequence as a 
single unit is important to complete the task in hand, if any of the CRUD expressions fail to 
execute then the system should consider the failure of the task in hand. An access control 
policy validates the execution of the CRUD expressions but the decision of rolling back 
the execution of the CRUD expressions in case of failure of execution is made by the 
application itself. 
The current thesis work demonstration will give a direction and solution where the 
security managers can design these policies as policy graphs and can reuse the policies 
in different scenarios. 
For reference Role Based Access Control (RBAC) model has been chosen as it is 
one of the most widely trusted and deployed access control model where access to data 
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is based on the role of a person (Kangsoo Jung, 2013)(D.Richard Kuhn, 2001) and the 
base of this work is S-DRACA which allows the execution of CRUD expressions in a 
single direction only (Óscar Morthgua Pereira, 2014). 
This Chapter is divided into four sections. Section 1.1 explains the problem which is 
addressed by this work, section 1.2 explains the solution proposed to solve the problem 
explained in pmblem formulation, section 1.3 explains the contribution of this work to 
current state of the art, section 1.4 brings light on technologies being used in the 
development of this work and section 1.5 explains structure of the presented work. 
1.1 Problem Formulation 
Popular access control models such as RBAC, DAC, MAC etc. provide an 
environment where the security of the information is just limited to the authentication of 
the user and authorizing the access to the secured resources. These access control 
models lack in providing the control over action performed by the user on the secured 
information (Ausanka-Crues,2006). Previously reported work S-DRACA, was able to 
provide a secured structure where a user was restricted to execute the allowed CRUD 
expressions for a particular role in one direction (Óscar Mortágua Pereira,2014; Óscar 
Morthgua Pereira, 201 5). 
However, it lacks in providing the flexibility that a security manager can have while 
designing the policies. It allowed the execution of the CRUD expressions in single 
direction which limits the security managers to design the policies following a unidirected 
path. Moreover security experts could only design the policies for the system where 
execution of a CRUD expression results into one possible state and system cannot enters 
back into its previous state. 
To address the problems elaborated in the introduction section and the limitations of 
S-DRACA (Secured, Distributed and Dynamic RBAC for relational applications) and 
RBAC (Role Based Access Control), this thesis work presents a model which combines 
the access control provided by current access control models with an environment where 
the security experts can design the policies in the form of policy graphs. 
As in database application the sequences of CRUD expressions are executed to 
achieve a particular task, therefore policies must be defined to act on the sequence level 
rather than acting on the execution of each CRUD expression (Óscar Morthgua Pereira, 
2014). If any of the CRUD expression fails to execute during the life cycle of the policy 
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graph then depending on the design of the policy continuing or discarding the execution of 
CRUD expressions is decided. 
Presented work also supports halting the execution of a policy graph by starting a 
new policy graph which is allowed for the user. The reason for including this feature into 
the model is to support the concept of one method calling another method in a program, 
and with the addition of this feature to the model the predefined policies can be reused in 
different scenarios. 
The model given by this work defines the rules that should be followed while 
designing access control policies as policy graphs, and the conditions that should be met 
when a policy graph is halted to start the execution of another sequence validated by 
another policy graph. 
Therefore motivations for this work can be summarized as follows: 
The security gap in the current Access Control Models, where the user 
actions are not controlled after he is authorised access rights to a valuable 
resource. 
The requirement of having control over the sequence of CRUD expressions 
rather controlling the execution of single CRUD, as database driven 
applications require a sequence of operations to complete a task. 
The need of flexibility in the design of the security policies, which is required 
by the security experts while mapping the real world implementation of appli- 
cations to the policies design. 
1.2 Proposed Solution 
Based on S-DRACA which is Secured Distributed Dynamic RBAC model (2.2), this 
thesis work gives an access control model which supports designing the access control 
policies in the form of sequences of CRUD expressions by implementing the structure 
using directed graphs. The Model introduces the flexibility in the design and execution of 
the policies. This work uses RBAC model as referente model by authenticating the clients 
based on the roles they are assigned, but after the client is authenticated, presented 
model control the operations a client can perform on the database by validating the action 
against the policies which are implemented as graph structures. 
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Pmposed solution works in an environment where the databases support the 
execution of CRUD expressions. If the underlying data source does not support the 
execution of CRUD operation the model cannot be applied to it as the design of the 
security policies is implemented by graph structures of CRUD expressions regarded as 
policy graph. The access control policies are stored in the database and when they are 
requested then they are structured as directed graphs. 
Designing the policy is made flexible by using graph structure approach where the 
execution on one CRUD expression can lead to one or more options of CRUD 
expressions that can be executed. To provide a solution that meets the demands of 
complex database applications, halting of the policy graphs is being permitted by storing 
the state of the system in which the execution of one sequence was paused to start the 
new sequence. 
1.3 Contributions 
This works aims to provide an Access Contml Model that can be applied with the 
current access control model such as RBAC, DAC, MAC etc. and it pmvides the contml 
over the execution of the CRUD expressions that a user can execute. Presented model 
provides the rules for designing the access contml policies and the rules that should be 
followed when a policy graph used for validating the execution of the sequence of CRUD 
expressions is halted to start the execution of a new policy graph. This works tries to map 
the real world application implementations into the design of the policies. 
The presented work allows the policies to be written in the form of directed graphs of 
CRUD expression which can utilize the access control provided by the other directed 
graphs of CRUD expression. This feature allows the security experts to design policies in 
an efficient way as the policies can be reused in different scenarios. 
1.4 Tools and infrastructure used 
Java is being used to implement the various components of the model, which gives 
the work advantage of being portable. The standard libraries for Java Serialization and 
Deserialization allows sending and retrieving objects to and fmm remote machines, and 
this feature was used to send the policies as graph structure objects to the client side and 
on the client side these objects were deserialized to obtain the predefined structure of the 
policies(0racle Java Documentation,2015). 
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NetBeans IDE is being used to develop different components of this work. This IDE 
provides the environment where the web applications, desktop applications and mobile 
applications can be designed, code can be indented, a specific word can be easily found 
in hundreds of lines of code and code can be refracted too(Netbeans IDE features,2015). 
The predefined policies are stored in the relational database using Microsoft SQL 
Server. SQL Server Management Studio (SSMS) 2012 is being used to design the 
queries for storing and retrieving the data from the database. SSMS provides an 
environment where all the components of SQL Server can be accessed, managed, 
configured and developed( SQL Server Mangement Studi0~2015). 
Jgrapht library is being used to create the graph structures which represent the 
predefined stored access control policies. As the graph structures are extensively used in 
this project, so using Jgrapht library for implementing the structure of the policies reduced 
an overhead of implementing method for designing the graphs. This library provided the 
functions such as adding the node, adding a directed edge, adding loops, adding 
weighted edges etc. It supports various types of graphs such as directed, undirected, 
unmodifiable and listenable etc(Jgrapht,2015) 
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation 
Thesis structure is categorised into chapters and these chapters are further 
subcategorised into sections. Chapter 2 is State of the Art which elaborates the work done 
in the area of access control, Chapter 3 is Technological Background which brings light on 
the various technologies used in the building of the project, Chapter 4 is Access Control 
Model for the orchestration of CRUD expressions which describes the presented model, 
the rules for constructing the model and the proof of concept, the final Chapter 5 is the 
Conclusion and future work. 
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State of the Art 
This section gives an overview of the current state of proposed thesis work based 
on access control policies, databases and distributed applications. The section includes 
the discussions on the access control policies, Secured Distributed, Dynamic Role Based 
Access Control (S-DRACA) and the recent related works in the field of access control. An 
insight of how presented model tries to create various components based on the ideas 
from them has also been presented. 
2.1 Access Con trol Policies 
In this section we discuss the current access control policies. Access to valuable 
sources is restricted by defining the set of rules known as policies in order to allow only 
authorized user to access authorized source. The objective of designing these policies is 
to make the resources only available to legitimate users by restricting unauthorized 
access attempts. The most important requirements that must meet are integrity, 
availability and secrecy. An important requirement of any information management system 
is to protect data and resources against unauthorized disclosure (secrecy) and 
unauthorized or improper modifications (integrity), while at the same time ensuring their 
availability to legitimate users (no denials-of-service) (Pierangela Samarati, 2001) 
To protect the data and resources from unauthorized access, presented work 
inherits the security layer of S-DRACA which provides the feature of authentication and 
encryption. This security layer has not been altered by any means in this work; therefore 
the secured channel provided by S-DRACA is inherited too. In order to proted a resource, 
rules are defined as policy graph and then these policies are being used to validate the 
actions of the client. The development of an access control mechanism normally follows 
three distinct phases as, (i) the definition of the access control policies; (ii) the creation of 
the security model to be followed and (iii) the definition of the access control enforcement 
mechanism (Pierangela Samarati,2001). 
Before getting into the details of the access control models, there is a need to 
understand the two entities Object and Subject. Object is the resource that is being 
accessed by an authorized entity. Subject is the entity that has perrnission of accessing 
Object. According to the requirements and the needs of the system, access control policy 
can be formalized in categorise of: 
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Discretionary Access Control 
Mandatory Access Control 
Attribute Based Access Control 
Role Based Access Control 
The details of these four classes of access control policies have been further discussed in 
subsections 2.1 .I to 2.1.4. 
2.1.1 Discretionary Access Control (DAC) 
Discretionary Access Control authorizes the access to an object solely based on the 
identity of the accessing entity and the access rights specified for that identity on every 
object present in the system. Users who are given privileges of accessing the objects can 
pass their privileges to other users, where as granting or revoking the privileges is done 
by an administrative authority. DAC policies are what commercial operating systems 
typically enforce. Here, the principals are users; the objects include files, 110 devices, and 
other passive system abstractions. 
DAC can be implemented by associating an Access Control List to the objects, and 
these ACL define what are the access right for that particular object and who can have 
access to it. Systems which implement the DAC policies have access rights equal to 
NONE until they are defined by a policy. The assignment of privileges using a DAC model 
can also be implemented via a matrix form where each user has a row and each object 
has a column. Access Matrix was proposed by Lampson for the protection of resources 
within the context of operating systems, and later refined by Graham and Denning, the 
model was subsequently formalized by Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullmann (HRU model), who 
developed the access control model proposed by Lampson to the goal of analyzing the 
complexity of determining an access control policy (Pierangela Samarati, 2001). 
Table I shows an access control matrix for the DAC system specifying the access 
rights of different users in a file system. This policy structure is being implemented using 
matrix for a file system. 
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Table 1 Access Control Matrix for DAC 
As per the matrix shown in Table 1, the access rights and the owner of the objects 
can be defined as access control policies for the DAC model implementation. 
Implementing the policies through the access matrix will require a excessive disk space; 
therefore this matrix can be implemented using ACLs where each object will carry a list 
specifying the access control rights for each subject. Authorization tables can also be 
used to implement the policies defined by the DAC Model. Table 2 shows an example of 
authorization table for Subject 2 (shown in Table 1) indicating separate colurnns for the 
subjects, objects and for the access right. The formation of this table will eliminate the 
empty spaces that was available in Access Matrix by specifying each access right 
individually. However, one of the drawbacks of the DAC is that it doesn't control the 
distribution of the information once being accessed by the legitimate user. For example 
Subje-1 shown in Table I can read File-I and can write it to File-2 whereas Subject-2 
now can read and execute the contents of File-1. This is a big security issue. 
Su bject\Object 
Subject-1 
Su bject-2 
Su bject-3 
Subject-4 
Table 2 Authorization Table for a particular subject 
I Subject I Access Right I Object I 
File-I 
ReadMlrite 
- 
ReadIExecute 
- 
I I I Subject-I I Read I File-2 I I I I Subject-I I Execute I File-2 I 
File-2 
Write 
ReadIExecute 
- 
W rite 
F i le3 
OwnlReadMlritelExecute 
- 
ReadIExecute 
- 
Fi le4 
- 
- 
- 
Read 
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2.1.2 Mandatory Access Control (MAC) 
MAC is a type of access control that allows a central entity to constrain the ability of 
a subject. A central authority defines the policies to deny or allow the access to the 
resources. In comparison to DAC, the owners of the information are not entitled to have 
the privilege to change the policies in MAC mechanism. MAC aims to define the policies 
which can be implemented for an entire system rather than designing the policy for a part 
of the system. In MAC model each object and subject in the system is assigned a security 
level based on which the access control enforced. The security level associated with the 
object defines the importance of the information contained in that object and the loss that 
can happen if that information is leaked to an unauthorized subject. Whereas the security 
level for the subject is the level of trust that system has on the subject for not leaking the 
secured information contained in the object to unauthorized entity (Samarati, 1994). 
Allowing access to a resource depends on the security level of subject that is trying 
to access the object. Processing of the request takes into consideration the irnportance of 
the secured information and the trust in the entity trying to access the information. The 
security level of the subject is compared to the security level of the object and based on 
the relationship between the security levels the decision of granting or denying the 
permission is made. 
There are the two principles that are required to be true while implementing the 
MAC model in a system supporting the MAC policies as follows: 
Read Down: Subject's security level must be at least as high as of the object 
it is about to read. This allows only trusted subjects to read the data. 
Write Up: Subject can only write to an object if and only if Object has the 
security level as that of the Subject or higher than the Subject. This principie 
ensures that only trusted subject can write to the object. 
Therefore the subjects who are of high security level can read the information from a 
file but cannot write it to the files which are at lower security levels making the information 
unavailable to the subjects of lower security level. AI1 this is being achieved by following 
the above two mentioned principles. 
MAC introduces the levels of security in a hierarchical form which in military terms or 
in generic terms can be classified as Top Secret (TS), Secret (S), Confidential (C) and 
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Unclassified (UC). Therefore if the object is classified as S, then a subject who has 
security level of S or lower can only write to the object, whereas the subject who has the 
security level at least S or higher can read fmm this object. Write Up principle can damage 
the information of an object with higher security level as the subject with lower security 
level will not be able to read what is being written and an over write can be obtained 
(Pierangela Samarati, 2001), (Amanda Crowell). 
Figure 7 shows the MAC hierarchical flow of information in the system 
corresponding to security levels assigned to the object and subject in a system. 
Figure 7 MAC hierarchical flow of information 
Mandatory Access Policies for secrecy can also be understood by studying the Bell 
and LaPadulla model which follows two rnain principles known as No-read-up and No- 
writedown. Biba Model has shown the implementation of MAC policies for the integrity by 
following No-readdown and No-write-up rule (Pierangela Samarati, 2001). 
2.1.3 Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) 
As the name explains, access control is based on the attributes of the resources to 
be accessed and the attributes of the entity trying to access them. ABAC is a logical 
access contml rnodel that is distinguishable because it contmls access to objects by 
evaluating rules against the attributes of entities (subject and object), operations, and the 
environment relevant to a request(Vincent C. Hu, 2014). Since past decade, rnany security 
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experts and organizations have started to use ABAC for access control. In December 
201 1, the Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) Roadmap and 
Implementation Plan v2.0 took a step of calling out ABAC as a recommended access 
control model for promoting information sharing between diverse and disparate 
organizations(ABAC). 
ABAC systems are capable of enforcing both DAC and MAC concepts. Attributes of 
a subject can be its name, address, date of birth, role in an organization etc. These 
attributes combined with themselves or with other attributes forms an identity of the 
subject. 
2.1.4 Role Based Access Control (RBAC) 
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is a popular implementation of ABAC, where 
roles are considered as attributes and based on this attribute access control is 
implemented. As the name explains itself, it is access control model based on the roles 
allotted to the entities present in the system. In RBAC entities perform certain sets of 
operation which are represented by their roles. Current RBAC model doesn't provide the 
support for controlling the operation performed by the entities after the roles has been 
assigned. This is a security gap which is tried to reduce with this work. 
As role of the entity represents the level of authonzation it gets for performing tasks 
on the valuable resource, therefore it is important to have a separation of duties related 
with the roles. In separation of duties the level of authority given to a particular role is 
tried to be restricted. As in real world one person can't perform all the roles in an 
organization, therefore different categories of tasks are assigned to different roles for the 
fulfilment of a managed and successful enterprise. 
These separate tasks of duty can be categorised as follows: 
Static Separation of Duty: In this, the roles are being assigned to the individuals 
beforehand and the users perform the transactions according to pre-assigned 
roles. 
Dynamic Separation of Duty: In this, the roles of the individuals can vary according 
to the demand of the system. A user can play different roles as the requirement of 
the system changes at runtime. 
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Sandhu et al. have discussed these categories in more details by considering a 
scenario where an owner of a car cornpany is assigned the role of the rnanager. In static 
separation of duty the owner can only authorize the production of the cars, hire more 
ernployees, take care of the accounts etc. But in case of dynarnic separation of duty the 
owner of the company can be the buyer for a car frorn the cornpany and the seller too. 
Dynarnic Separation of duty brings flexibility to the systern (Ravi S.Sandhu, 1995). 
RBAC model implernents the policies based on the group of people which can 
perforrn a specific task. Taking an example of flourishing access control in a cornpany, a 
scenario where the ernployees of the cornpany can be divided into different groups which 
can perforrn the set of task. These groups can be seen as separate group of managers, 
technicians, database handlers etc. This feature of RBAC model allows it to be easily 
irnplernented in rnany scenarios. As it provides the platforrn where restriction to a resource 
is based on the task a person perforrns by utilising that resource. 
A role can have an associated set of rnernbers. As a result, RBAC provides a means 
of naming and describing many-to-many relationships between individuals and right 
(David F. Ferraiolo, 1992). 
Figure 8 shows role relationships of the user in an environment where the Role-A is 
set of two rnembers and Role-B has only one member. In this case, these users are 
allowed to access two different resources based on their roles assignrnent. Transactions 
are being used to show that changes made to the file will either follow the entire rule or 
none. 
It has been reported that when assigning the roles, principle of least privilege is 
being irnplemented by the security manager(Ravi S.Sandhu, Edward J.Coyne, Hal 
L.Feinstein and Charles E.Youman, 1995). This principle states that a user is given no 
more privilege than it need to access the inforrnation for its needs. Ensuring least privilege 
requires identiiing what user's job is, determining the minimurn set of privileges required 
to perforrn that job and restricting the user to a domain with only those privileges (David F. 
Ferraiolo, 1 992). 
A very irnportant concept of RBAC rnodel is role hierarchies. Role hierarchies 
represent the level of authorization a role holds for accessing a resource. If the role is of 
adrninistrator, then operations such as Insert, Delete, and Update are being allowed but if 
the role is of the reader then these operations are not authorized. In organizations 
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mangers hold the roles to modify the information, but the employees are categorised in 
roles where they can either insert or read information or can perform both operations. 
trânsaction 
Figure 8 Role Relationshíp 
RBAC is a flexible model as it takes on the real world organizational characteristics 
and defines them as policies (David F. Ferraiolo, 1992). Figure 9 shows an example of a 
bank showing Multi-Role relationships of the bank Manager, Accountant and Clerk wíth 
different subjects as well as objects. In this figure Manager inherits the membership of the 
Accountant and Clerk hence has access to the transactions of a11 the members including 
accountant and clerk as well as his own. Whereas for accountant, the membership of 
clerk is being inherited hence has the access to all the transactions of the clerk and his 
own but not that of the manager. However, the clerk is only allowed to have access to the 
transactions which he was assigned excluding others. 
National Institute Of Standards and Technology proposed RBAC model which was 
defined in terms of four component models named: (i) Core RBAC; (ii) Hierarchical RBAC; 
(iii) Static separation of Duty Relations; and (iv) Dynamic separation of Duty Relations 
(D.Richard Kuhn, 2001). Core RBAC models defines minimum set of RBAC element 
which are essential to implement an RBAC model such as the user-role assignment and 
the permission-role assignment relations. However, in Hierarchical RBAC model, the 
support for role hierarchy was introduced. The user with superior role automatically 
inherits the permissions assigned to the roles that are lower in hierarchy and roles who 
are lower in hierarchy automatically inherit the users of roles higher in hierarchy. In Static 
Separation of Duty Relation model, the exclusivity behveen the users and the roles 
assigned to them is being introduced. This can be understood by taking an example of 
security guard and the clerk in a bank, both have two totally separate roles and therefore 
the role of security is not to be assigned to the role of the security guard (Virgil D. Gligor, 
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1998). The Dynamic Separation of Duty Relation model defines the exclusivity between 
the roles that are activated as part of user sessions. 
Figure 9 Multi-Role Relationships 
In the article entitled "Role-Based Access Control Modelsn reported by Ravi S. 
Sandhu (Ravi S.Sandhu, 1995), RBAC has been defined in terrns of three different 
models which show how flexible and generalized RBAC can be. These models were 
defined on the basis of different aspects of RBAC and how they can be related to different 
scenarios. 
2.2 Secured Distributed, Dynamic Role Based Access Control (S- 
DRACA) 
Secured Distributed, Dynamic Role Based Access Control (S-DRACA) presents a 
structure which has a security layer providing authentication and a secured channel for 
communication. It makes an attempt in overcoming the security gap in RBAC model by 
restricting the execution of the CRUD expressions allowed for a role in one direction( 
Diogo José Domingues Regateiro, 2014). 
S-DRACA provides an easy interaction between the users and relational databases 
without the overhead of having knowledge of the database schema and access control 
policies. It provides a platforrn for the application users where they can design the 
application without having pre-knowledge of the access control policies. 
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S-DRACA stores the pre-defined policies as sequence of CRUD expressions which 
act as permissions for the authorized roles to execute a CRUD operation. These policies 
are being retrieved by the client side by making a request to the server; an entity on the 
client side uses these pre-defined policies to validate the execution of CRUD expressions. 
It enforces the changes made to RBAC policies at run-time, therefore the change in policy 
on the server side is mapped to the client side and the application can change its 
behaviour and avoiding the run time exceptions. (Óscar Mortágua Pereira, 2014) 
The granular information about the architecture of S-DRACA has been further 
explained in Chapter 3 section 3.1 
2.3 Related Works 
As the demand and need of access control has changed over the past few years we 
have seen many researchers trying to give better models meeting the demands of the 
different branches of the business world. In this section we discuss in brief some of the 
works that has been done in the area of access control in the past few years. 
2.3.1 Hybrid approach for XML access control (HyXAC) 
Mangona Thimma considered the growth of the usage of XML and gave a model 
named as 'Hybrid approach for XML access control', which enhances the XML access 
control model (Manogna Thimma, 201 5). HyXAC pre-processes user queries by rewriting 
the queries and eliminating the parts of the queries which are violating the access control 
rules. In particular, HyXAC firstly pre-processes user queries by rewriting queries and 
removing parts violating access control rules, and then evaluates the re-written queries 
using sub-views, if they are available. 
In HyXAC, views are not defined on a per-role basis; instead a sub-view is defined 
for each access control rule. The roles sharing identical rules will share sub-views. 
Moreover, HyXAC dynamically allocates memory and secondary storage resources to 
materialize and cache sub-views to improve query performance. We have conducted 
extensive experiments, and the results show that HyXAC improves query processing 
efficiency while optimizes the use of system resources. The QFilter approach used in 
HyXAC for query pre-processing and been claimed to optimize the usage of system 
resource that alternatively improves the performance of query processing. 
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2.3.2 JIF 
Jif (Java + information flow) is a security typed programming language written in 
java that extends Java with support for information flow control and access control. It 
provides access control and information-flow control both at run time and compile time by 
using the labels (JIF, 2015). The labels describe how the information flow should be used. 
For example considera java script label as: 
int {Alice -> Bob) x; 
The label in the above example explains that information in variable x is controlled by 
Alice and Alice permits Bob to see the information. Thus one can not only know that the 
variable x is of type int but also knows about the flow of information explained by the label. 
However, if the label is described in other direction as: 
int {Alice <- Bob ) x; 
Then that means the information is owned by Alice and Alice permits Bob to make 
changes to the information contained in variable x. Hence to summarize these label 
annotations, one can conclude that a Jif compiler analyses information flows within 
programs to determine whether they enforce the confidentiality and integrity of 
information. One of the disadvantages of Jif is the lack of libraries those should be 
translated from Java to Jif to make Jif usable in a larger scale. 
L Although signatures can permit the use Java libraries, but it still requires to write those signatures. Nevertheless using signatures for Java classes does not provide 
security because no check is done to verify that the labels of the signatures wrrespond to 
the security of the Java classes. For now this has to be done by hand. Moreover, the Jif 
has been mostly used to rnanage the information flow at the application level and not to 
access data in RDBMS, so other tools must be used to compensate(B0niface Hicks, 
2007). 
I 
2.3.3 Paragon Policy Language 
Paragon is an extension to the java language that enables practical programming with 
information flow wntrols (Paragon, 2015). In this language the entities those are related to 
the information flow are described as actors which can be a user, resources, a system 
component etc. These actors are represented as object references. A program policy is 
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used to label the information containers (local variables, fields) and specifies to which ac- 
t o r ~  the contained information will flow. For example, the code fragment shown below can 
creates regular instances of the User and File class, where alice and file-I can play a 
dual role; both as program variables, and as actors in Paragon policies. 
Actors as object references: 
User bob = new UserO; 
User alice = new User(); 
File file-1 = new File(); 
File f ile-2 = new File(); 
Paragon Policies: 
po l i cyp l  = {alice:; bob:);  
policy p2 = {Flie f :); 
A policy consists of a set of items, each specifying a particular actor or a group of 
actors. For example, policy p l  shown in above code fragment, states that information may 
flow to specific user alice or bob and policy p2 states that information may flow to any file. 
This makes the policy {Object o:} the most permissive, and the policy with no clauses 
(denoted {:I) the most restrictive paragon policy. Paragon also defines the clauses for the 
states which can restrict the flow of information for the actors (Niklas Broberg, 2013). 
When compared to Jif, Paragon has the advantage of having the flexibility of the 
concept of locks. Paragon can províde different declassifying methods to work on different 
data in compare to single declassify construct in case of Jif. However, still, much work is 
left to be done before Paragon can become a serious competitor to existing programming 
such as Jif. It requires both theoretical and practical work, in particular if declassification 
mechanisms are shared among threads. A substantial formalisation of Paragon's type 
system has been lacked so far, including a proof of soundness with respect to information 
flow security. 
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2.3.4 Multi-Leve1 Dynamic Access Control Model 
Recently, Zhou et al. (Yanjie Zhou, 201 5)has formalized a five-level dynarnic access 
control rnodel architecture which describes the relation between access control systerns 
and applications. They used Role-based Access Control (RBAC) as a reference access 
control rnodel. RBAC rnodel has been described in a five-level architecture followed by 
web services integration into RBAC rnodel. The reported rnodel distinguishes two kinds of 
actions in the entire access control systerns: the administrative actions and the application 
action. These actions rnay cause changes of the access control cornponents and 
resources. The reported five-level in proposed rnodel are clairned to dernonstrate the logic 
relation between access control systerns and applications. It also explains that dynarnic 
property of access control is partly decided by applications. 
2.3.5 Graph theory to access control 
In 2004, a researcher Ravi Sandhu frorn George Mason University, USA reported a 
perspective on the connections between graphs and access control rnodels, particularly 
with respect to the safety problern and dynarnic role hierarchies( Ravi Sandhu, 2004). The 
work explored a connection between graphs and information security especially in the 
area of access control and authorization. 
2.3.6 Security-driven model-based dynarnic adaptation 
In 2010, Morin et al. reported a rnethodology for irnplernenting securitydriven 
applications by dernonstrating a rnodel narned security-driven rnodel-based dynarnic 
adaptation, reflecting the access control policy (Brice Morin, 2010). The rnodel addresses 
I a problern where even with the separation of the policies and the application code proved 
in the theory but never fully done is practice, leading to some rules being written directly in 
the application code. The approach uses meta-rnodels that describe the access control 
I policies and the application architecture. It defines the rnapping (statically and 
dynarnically) of the access control policies meta-rnodel to the application architecture 
meta-rnodel. However, the rnodel lack in addressing how to statically irnplernent secure 
and dynarnic security rnechanisrns. 
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Chlipala et al. (Chlipala, 2015) has demonstrated a simple model for programming 
the web named UrNVeb, which allows programmers to write CRUD expressions that can 
check statically the access control policies in a system backed by a DBMS. UrNVeb is a 
domain-specific, statically typed functíonal programming language for programming 
modern web applications. UriWeb's model is unified, where programs are compiled in a 
single programming language to other "Web standards" languages (Chlipala, 2010). It 
supports novel kinds of encapsulation of Web-specific state and exposes simple 
concurrency where programmers can reason about distributed, multithreaded 
applications. It allows the programmers to write the CRUD operations to check statically 
the access control policies present in the DBMS. Programs are developed to check that 
data involved in the CRUD expressions is accessible through some polices. For policies to 
vary from user to user queries that check them can use actual data and the extension of 
the SQL which is based on what information needs to be disclosed to user on the basis of 
what the user already knows. However, UrNVeb programming documentation requires 
and is limited to Haskell and ML expertise making it particularly suitable for statically typed 
functional programming. 
2.3.8 Reflective Database Access Control (RDBAC) 
In 2008, Olson reported on the Reflective Database Access Control (RDBAC) (Lars E. 
Olson, 2008). RDBAC aids the management of database access controls by improving 
the expressiveness of policies. In this model, the CRUD expressions are the privileges in 
the database itself rather than static privileges defined in the access control lists (ACL). 
Transaction Datalog given by Bohner et al. (Anthony J. Bonner, 1997)can be used to 
express the reflective access control policies. 
2.3.9 Java EE 
Java Enterprise Editíon (Java EE) is an extension of Java platForm and is the standard in 
community-driven enterprise software (Oracle Java Documentation, 201 5). Java EE is 
developed using the Java Community Process, with contributions from industry experts, 
commercial and open source organizations, Java User Groups, and countless individuals. 
A Java EE application server can handle transactions, security, and management of the 
components it is deploying, in order to enable developers to concentrate more on the 
business logic of the components rather than on infrastructure and integration tasks. It 
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uses the @RolesAllowed annotation to enforce RBAC policies directly at the methods 
level, controlling the pemissions to invoke them. However, it does not i den t i  who is 
invoking the protected methods, meaning any user on the allowed roles can get access to 
the protected method. 
2.3.1 0 Annotated objects 
Object-sensitive RBAC (ORBAC) is an extension of RBAC that can be used with object- 
oriented programming languages (Jeffrey Fischer, 2009). ORBAC contmls the access at 
the level of single objects allowing a fine grained control. Unlike some frameworks, it 
allows developers to write access code knowing if they are violating any access control 
policy or not through its type system. 
In 2010, Zamett et al. also reported RBAC in Java via Proxy Objects using Annotations 
(Jeff Zamett, 2010). Their proposed system creates proxy objects which only contain 
methods to which a client is authorized access based on the role specifications and hence 
the potentially untrusted clients that use Remote Method Invocation (RMI) then receive 
proxy objects rather than the originals. They present solution that can be applied to control 
the access to methods of remote objects via Java RMI, a framework that allows an 
application to use objects that exist in a different application, possibly in a different 
machine. 
Fischer et al. presented a more fine-grained access control that uses parameterized 
Annotations to assign roles to methods, whereas Zamett and co-workers defined each 
annotation required for the domain of the application. However, these appmaches in 
contrast to ours, do not ease the access to a relational database since the developers still 
need to acquire a deep understanding of the database schema and the defined access 
policies to access database objects. 
2.3.1 1 Access Control Driven by CRUD Expressions 
Recently, Oscar Pereira et al. have reported on the RBAC model to provide 
access control in a distributed environment using the CRUD expressions (Óscar Mortágua 
Pereira, 2014). The work demonstrate a software architectural model from which static 
RBAC mechanisms are automatically built, relieving programmers from mastering any 
schema. The concept of Business Schema was introduced as a set of CRUD operations. 
These sets of the CRUD operations were implemented as interface which hides the direct 
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and indirect modes of access. Pareira and co-workers has also extended this work with 
modification to previous reported results providing access control based on the policies 
that were driven from the sequence of CRUD operations. (Óscar Mortágua Pereira, 2014). 
Howerver, the model restricted the user to execute the CRUD operation in a single 
direction only. The present thesis work focussed on to demonstrate a direction and 
solution where sequences consist of permissions for executing an operation and the 
security managers can predefine the sequence in a more flexible way and is an extended 
modification of earlier reported work (Óscar Mortágua Pereira, 2014). 
Access Control Model to Support Orchestration 0f CRUD Expressions 1 2015 
Technological Background 
This chapter tries to bring light on the technological cornponents being used in this 
work. Following section gives an idea about how the various technical cornponents are 
being used in to achieve the goals of thesis and also give a brief introduction to these 
cornponents. 
3.1 S-DRACA Architecture 
In this section we bring light on the base of this work which is S-DRACA( Diogo José 
Dorningues Regateiro, 2014)(Óscar Mortágua Pereira, 2014). S-DRACA is a security 
rnodel which was designed for applications which are distributed and, based on RBAC 
rnodel it provides the access wntrol by wntrolling the flow of execution of CRUD 
expressions in single direction. S-DRACA gave the concept of Business Schema which 
is basically a rnodel frorn which source code can be autornatically generated to handle 
CRUD expressions. A Business Scherna can have relation to one or rnany CRUD 
expressions (Óscar Mortágua Pereira, 2014).This concept has been inherited to the 
present work. Figure 10 shows the architecture of the S-DRACA. 
I S-DRACA wnsisted of client side and server side cornponents, on the server side 
Policy Manager is an entity which is responsible for retrieving the policies frorn the 
I database know as Policy Server. These policies are designed by the sewrity experts by 
i: defining roles for the users and each user is assigned with set of sequences of CRUD 
expressions. Whenever there is a change in the policies clients are notified of the change 
by the Policy Manager. It also authenticates the clients and provides a secured encrypted 
channel of cornrnunication. 
Policy Extractor is en entity which is integrated in the client application using java 
annotation and its purpose if to obtains the policies frorn the Policy Manager and generate 
cornponents for access awareness. The Business Manager irnplernents the access 
control rnechanisrn for the client application by getting the policies frorn the Policy 
Manager and it also keeps track of the active sequence for a particular role in an active 
session. It is Business Manager who authorizes the exewtion of the CRUD operation of 
the Sequence and rnodifies thern dynarnically in acwrdance with the Policy Manager. 
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Figure 10 S-DRACA Architecture 
Access Mechanism is where the access control policies are being enforced and they 
inform the client application about the next authorized CRUD operation to be executed by 
requesting the Business Manger about the next CRUD to be executed in the active 
sequence. S-DRACA also provides a security layer named as AuthenticationIData 
Encryption which provides a secured communication channel between the client and the 
server via authentication and encryption. 
S-DRACA addressed the security aspect but it lacked in providing the flexibility by 
restricting security experts to design the policies following a single direction. 
3.2 Orchestration 
Orchestration in computing describes as an automatic process which arranges, 
manages and coordinates the complex computer system, middleware and the services. 
Orchestration is the result of automation. 
Orchestration is often discussed in context of systems where one component of the 
system provides service to another component following some policies. It defines the 
policies and service levels through automated workflows, provisioning, and change 
management. The request is sent to the central entity and the reply is provided to the 
requestor as the service it requested. 
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In the presented access control rnodel, a user is allowed to execute sequences of 
CRUD expressions which can be seen as a service which it has authorization to execute. 
One of the aims of this work is to control the execution of these authorized CRUD 
expressions. So this works airns to provide a service, which is controlling the execution of 
CRUD expressions allowed for a particular user. In this rnodel user application request a 
central entity which is deployed on the client side and this entity acts as a central 
repository for providing the service of controlling the execution of CRUD expressions and 
providing the interface for the client application to execute the next authorized CRUD 
expression. 
3.3 Relational Database Management System 
Current world dernands the speed in data processing and storing. A Database 
Managernent Systern (RDBMS) provides the users, a facility to rnanage their Relational 
Databases. In 1990, Edgar F. Codd invented the relational rnodel for database 
rnanagernent ( Edgar F.Codd, 1990). Database rnanagement systerns (DBMS) rnaintains 
the integrity of the data, provides security of the data, provide data availability and data 
independency. 
Relations Databases store data in the form of tables including rows and columns 
and the relation between two tables is rnaintained by having at least one same colurnn 
values in both tables. To ident i  the records of the table, a column is rnaintained where 
each value is unique known as the Prirnary key of the table. A Foreign key is the value in 
a table which identifies the records of another table to which it rnaintains a relation. 
Presented work uses the Relational database as a back end for the model. Access 
Control Policies are being stored in the relational database in the form of tables. 
Maintaining the integrity of the data present in the database is one of the irnportant 
key issues in any organization. For organizations the data is the key ingredient of the work 
to earn their reputation in the rnarket. In such big organizations the users need to execute 
a series of steps to futfil a task in hand. For exarnple, for opening a new user account in a 
bank, a series of insert operations have to be executed to inert the inforrnation into the 
database and if any of these operations fails, then the inforrnation provided in the 
database will not correct (S. Surnathi, S. Esakkirajan, 2007). 
"+ 
.. Distributed environrnent is the need of current business oriented world, which leads 
us to a situation where different users are trying to access and rnanipulate the data source 
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at the same time. This situation brings the database to an inconsistent sate where the 
integrity of the information is not maintained as severa1 read operation can be executed 
before the correct data is being written in the database. To avoid such situation DBMS 
supported locks are being used. The data which is being altered by a transaction during 
the execution of the transaction is regarded as data element. Lock can be defined as set 
of permissions for a transaction which allows only authorized operations to be executed 
for a particular data element. Transaction must get this permission from the Transaction 
manager before altering the value of the data element (S. Sumathi, S. Esakkirajan, 2007). 
Locking protocols are also being used in distributed environment to ensure that 
result of the execution of each transaction in a disordered pattern will be same as the 
execution of the transaction in seria1 order. 
DBMS must provide the data to the users in a reasonable format and cost so that 
the users can easily access the data moreover the access to the data must be authorized 
to legitimate users. The DBMS acts like a middle layer between the database and the 
client. It's the DBMS which provide the inter-operability feature to the databases. DBMS 
hides the complex structure of data storage from the user and just gives an abstract 
overview. 
Structured Query Language (SQL) is one of the most popular programming 
languages that are being used to write queries for the databases. Users state what 
information they want from the database or what they want to do to the data of the 
database via SQL and the DBMS take care of describing data structures for storing the 
data and retrieval procedures for answering queries. 
RDBMS keeps the data consistent by applying the following constraints ( Edgar 
F.Codd, 1990): 
Domain integrity: The domain integrity assures that the value of a particular 
column is of the column type and whether a null value can be inserted in that 
column or not. 
Entity integrity: The records in the table are uniquely identity by the Primary 
key of that table and entity integrity assures that the values of the primary 
key are not duplicated. 
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e Referential integrity: in this, the constraints guarantee that the value of a 
foreign key must exist as the value of the primary key which is being 
referenced. 
User defined integrity: User-defined integrity allows you to define specific 
business rules that do not fall into one of the other integrity categories 
3.4 Graph Theory for Access Control 
This section explains the generic idea behind graphs and how the implementation of 
graphs in access contml has evolved. Graphs are mathematical wncepts which are used 
to represent the relationship between objects. Euler published a paper on graphs which 
addressed the problem of Seven Bridges of Konigsberg and this paper laid the foundation 
of the graphs. Pmgrammers realized the potential in modelling the real world scenarios as 
graph structures which lead to the development of many algorithms based on these 
structures such as Dijkstra, Bellman-Ford etc. 
I A graph consists of Vertices which are also regarded as nodes and to represent a relationship between these vertices, edges are being used. Graph structures can be directed which means that the direction of the edge between the vertices defines the relationship between the vertices. Undirected graphs are the once in which the edges do not define any direction for the relationship among the vertices. The relationship between the vertices can also be represented as labelled edges. 
L 
The source of an edge is regarded as parent node and the destination of that edge if 
the child node. A node which has no incoming edges is regarded as the mot of the graph 
where as the node which has no outgoing edges is regarded as a leaf node. 
Vertices can be any real world entity which can be represented as an object in a 
programming language. Designing graphs totally depends on the needs of a problem and 
on the implementation choices of the programmer. Following is the graph structure which 
is designed to show the access wntrol maintained by Lampson's access matrix: 
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Table 3 Lampson's Access Matrix 
Figure 11 Example of graph representing Lampson's Access Matrix 
As we can see in the above example vertices represent the users and the files 
where as the access to the files is defined by the labelled edges which the user vertices 
holds to file vertices ( Ravi Sandhu, 2004). The label A represents the Read, Write, 
Execute (RWE) permissions, label B represents the Read and Write (RW), label C 
represents the Write and Execute (WE) permissions, label D represents the Read(R) 
permission, label E represents the Write (W) permission, label F represents that User-3 is 
the owner of File-I and he has the permission of Read, Write and Execute(RWE) 
permissions. 
Graphs can also be used to analyse the security of the system, one of the example 
of such graph is Attack Graph. Attack graphs are used to define all the paths which an 
intruder can use to enter a system and achieve his goals. Security experts use the attack 
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graphs to detect the threats and to design the measures to eradicate these threats (S. 
Jha, O. Sheyner , J. Wing, 2002). 
This thesis work takes above mentioned approaches into wnsideration and 
presents a rnodel where the stored sequence of CRUD operation which acts as access 
contml policies for the users, are fortnalized into graph structures. Graphs bring the 
flexibility component by providing the feature of directed edges, which enables the 
security experts to design the access control policies to meet the demands of the real 
world. Directed Edges of the graph allows the security experts to design the access 
contml policies to restrict users to follow a predefined path. 
3.5 Java 
Java is a universally accepted and used language. The popularity of java is based 
on its features such interoperability, secured, object-oriented and distributed. This thesis 
work uses java as the programrning language to irnplement the access control model 
because of the language being portable, object-oriented and distributed. 
Following section explains the Java Serialization and Deseralization which is being 
used in this work to send and retneve the access control policies. Java Reflection and 
Annotations are also being discussed in the following sections. 
3.5.1 Serialization and Deserialization 
Java serialization provides the mechanism where object's data and its type can 
be represented as sequence of bytes. In distributed environment data needs to be sent 
from one machine to another and this need is full filled by wnsidering the data to be sent 
to other machines as objects by using java serialization. 
Java provides an interface Serializable which is implemented by the class whose 
object is to be sent. ObjectOutputStrearn class is used to serialize an objed. The 
ObjectOutputStream class writes the object as series of byte characters and on the client 
side these objects are Deserialized by performing read from ObjectlnputStream to the 
same data type and in the same order as they were written. Java Serialization supports 
refracting which means that adding new fields to the class, changing static fields to non- 
static fields are automatically managed. A serialization Id is being used to know if the 
serialized object has been changed or not (Oracle, 2015)(Neward, Ted, 2015). 
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This work uses java serialization to send the graph structure of access control 
policies which are defined as sequence of CRUD expressions in the database. These 
graph structures are defined as object and then Java serialization and 
ObjectOutputStream is being used to send the policies to the client side. On the client 
side, these policies are retrieved as graph structures by deserialzing the object using 
ObjectlnputStream readobject 0. 
3.5.2 Reflection 
Reflection is generally used by applications which need to monitor or alter the 
runtime behaviour of a program running in a JVM. It allows a program to know contents of 
the classes, methods, fields at run time, without knowing their names at compile time. 
Reflection is a mechanism present in the Java Virtual Machine that provides the 
ability of code inspection or modification. For its usage, the Reflection API is provided 
which can be used inside an application to execute the said abilities. Reflection shouldn't 
be used without a specific purpose, since for its abilities there are drawbacks as follows: 
More performance overhead 
Comparing to the normal programming way of class instantiation and method 
calling, where the compiler will generate runtime code for objects to be directly used, and 
its methods to be called directly without the need of a second call, Reflection needs to get 
the correct type dynamically, so it will have to find its class structure at runtime in the 
classpath, and its methods are called via a second method, which will cause delays at 
runtime. 
Security restrictions 
Permission for using Reflection is granted by the Security Manager in the Java 
Virtual Machine at runtime, thus, if not configured properly can lead the application to 
terminate prematurely. 
Security issues 
Reflection can also be used as an alternate way to instantiate a class, which doesn't 
even needs to be present at compile time, and cal1 it's methods. Special care should be 
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taken in this technique, because is easy to strip out the class protection mechanisms and 
not respect them afterwards. 
Unwanted behaviour 
With the abilities it has, using Reflection can lead to unwanted or unexpected side- 
effects that, without the compiler's oversee, will be harder to debug. 
3.5.3 Annotation: 
Annotations are the form of metadata that is being used in java. Annotations don't 
have direct affect on the operations of the program but are used to provide information to 
the compiler; they can be used to generate code or XML files (The Java Tuitorials,2015). 
The at sign character (@) indicates the compiler that the following text is an 
annotation. Annotations can be applied to the declaration of a class, field, methods etc. 
With the release of java 8 now annotations can be applied to the use of types. 
A few examples of where types are used is the expression where a new instance of 
the class is being created (new), when casting is being done, implementsclauses, 
and throws clauses. This form of annotation is called a type annotation (Type annotations 
and Pluggable type Systems, 2015). 
Java 8 release doesn't provide a type checking framework but it allows writing 
modules for type checking which can be used with java compiler. Following example 
shows the use of Annotation to support the type check required for a string variable which 
should not contain a null value and to void the triggering of NullPointerException: 
@NotNull String name; 
A module can be designed to achieve this kind of type checking framework. When 
code is compiled including the NotNull module, the NotNull module checks the program 
for the potential problem and provides wamings if it detects any problem. Multiple type 
checking modules can be used for different type of errors. With the judicious use of type 
annotations and the presence of pluggable type checkers, you can write code that is 
stronger and less prone to error. 
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Annotations can have elements which can be named or unmade and these 
elements can be given values. In the Figure 12 annotations are being used to describing 
the properties of the node object of the class Node-lnfo: 
Str ing  node-namel); 
Figure 12 Annotation Type Definition and Annotation Elements 
In the Figure 12 we can see the use of Annotations in the expressions of node-id 
declaration, the Qinterface being used to define custom annotation and how this custom 
annotation provides information about the node. @Target tells that this annotation can be 
applied to a constructor; @Retention indicates how long annotations with the annotated 
type are to be retained. 
3.6 State Diagrams for complex system representation 
State diagrams are used to represent the states of the system when it is executing 
the programs to achieve a particular task in hand. They give an abstract description of the 
behaviour of the system. David Harel gave the model where the complex system can be 
explained using a diagrammatic approach representing the states of the system. 
His work became the base of modelling the system using the UML and also 
designing models which can express the system in more efficient way. In Harel's models 
rectangles are used to denote the states and to represent the transition from one state to 
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another arrows are being used. The amws are labelled to represent the event that 
caused the system to transit into another state( David HAREL, 1987). To understand 
Harel's model following example to the state diagram is given: 
Figure 13 Example of Harel's state diagram 
Above diagram shows the representation of system which enters into four stated 
namely A, B, C and D. The H' state is the most recently visited history state. The arrows 
are labelled with the events which lead to the transition of the stated. By default the 
system enters into state C which is denoted by arrow with dot in the end. If the system 
doesn't have any history state then only it will enter into state C. State D comprises of 
state C and B, indicating if the system is either in state B or C then it is automatically 
entered into state D. 
Harel's model is adopted in this work to represent the niles which a security expert 
need to keep in mind while designing the policies. These rules define the behaviour of the 
system while the execution of the predefined polcies. 
One of the works which is influenced by Harel is by Il-Yeol Song et al(ll-Yeol Song, 
Ki Jung Lee, 2007); they published a paper where focus of their work was to represent 
how an object of a class makes transitions to different states during its execution life span 
by using the concept of specialization state. In their technique the meaningful states of the 
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class were identified before building the actual state diagram. Three identification rules 
were applied - state-valued attributes, association paths, and constraints. 
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4 Access Control Model Supporting Orchestration Of CRUD 
Expressions 
An access control rnodel is an abstraction of an access control mechanisrn which 
enforces access control policies specdying who can access what information under what 
circurnstances.(Dae-Kyoo Kirn, Pooja Mehta, Priya Gokhale, 2006). Defining an access 
control model requires the formulization of rules that can be applied while designing the 
access control policies, the scenarios where access control policies can be applied. 
This chapter is divided into sections; section 4.1 explains the structure of access control 
policies, rules that should be followed while executing the access control policies are 
explained in sub section 4.1.1, the rules for designing policies are defined in sub section 
4.1.2, the inter Graph execution is explained in sub section 4.1.3. Section 4.2 provides 
the proof of concept. 
4.1 Structure Supported By the Presented Access Control Model 
Presented rnodel supports the design of the Access Control Polices in the form of 
graph structures. It allows rnapping the implementation of the applications accessing the 
database into the design of the Access Control Policies. This section defines the rules 
which need to be followed while designing the Access Control policies. 
In this thesis work design of the access control policies for validating the execution 
of authorized CRUD expressions for a particular user is irnplernented by considering the 
' sequence of the CRUD expression as a graph structure connected by directed edges and 
' regarded as a Policy Graph. Designing the access control policies in the form of graph 
structure allows the security experts to design the policies which can be applied in 
different scenarios. 
This work inherits the concept of nodes and directed edges from the graph theory 
i and applies this concept to the structure of the Access Control Policies. Therefore the structure of the access control policies consists of nodes which are connected via directed edges. Nodes represent the Business Schema which is a set of CRUD expressions that 
an application can execute and the relationship between the nodes is maintained by a 
directed edge. 
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Applying the graph structure for creating the policies requires the formulation of 
rules to be followed while designing the policy structure. The basic terminologies and rules 
associated with creation of access control policies are as follows: 
Policy Graph: directed graph structure whose nodes consists Business 
Schema. It is the access control policy which is used for validating the exe- 
cution of CRUD expressions. 
Terminating Node: In a Policy Graph a terminating node's execution pro- 
vides the user with two options, first if the terminating node has any outgoing 
edges then the user can still continue with the current Policy graph by re- 
questing the Business schema of the target node, and second the user can 
request a new Policy graph and current Policy graph will no longer validates 
the execution of the CRUD expressions unless it is requested again. 
Halt Node: In a Policy Graph a node can request the execution another Pol- 
icy Graph. This node is regarded as Halt Node. 
Root Node: it is the node of the graph where the execution of the Policy 
Graph starts by executing the Business Schema of the root. 
Policy graph must have at least one root and terminating node. 
In Policy graph the root and terminating nodes can be halt nodes. 
Policy graphs can have multiple root, terminating and halt nodes. 
The terminating node which has no outgoing edge cannot be a halt node. 
If a node has no outgoing edges then by default it is a terminating node 
If a node has a single outgoing edge and that edge is to itself then by default 
it is a terminating node 
If a node has no incoming edges then by default it is a root node. 
If node has only one incoming edge and that edge is a from the node itself 
then the node by default becomes a root node. 
Presented model validates the execution of the sequence of CRUD expressions via 
a Policy Graph. Therefore if the execution of any CRUD expression belonging to se- 
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quence fails then the decision of rolling back the execution of sequence of CRUD expres- 
sion is left to the application itseif. 
4.1.1 Rules fór the execution of the Policy Graph 
This section explains the rules for the execution of the policy graph. Policy graph 
validates client's execution of the CRUD expression. The rules for executing the Policy 
graph are: 
In Policy graph the execution of the graph always starts at the root node. 
The execution of the CRUD expression belonging to the Business Schema 
present on the source of the directed edge and the direction of the edge 
decides the next Business Schema to be executed. 
D If the Policy graph contains single node than this node is a root and 
terminating node. 
4.1.2 Rules fór designing the Policy Graph 
Following rules tries to map the scenarios of real world database driven application 
where user executes CRUD expressions to achieve a particular task. 
4.1.2.1 A single node can tepresent a complete Policy Graph 
A Policy Graph can be composed of a single Business Schema which allows the 
security manager to design the policy allowing the user to execute the CRUD expressions 
of one and only one Business Schema. Therefore a system can have one and only one 
state. Figure 14 shows an example of executing an update query for assigning the 
department to an employee. Figure 15 shows the structure of the Policy Graph for 
validating the execution of the single CRUD expression represented as a SQL update 
query- 
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public void AssignDepartmentToEmployee (int Emp - ID, String Emp - ~epartment) 
throws SQLException { 
PreparedStatement ps = conn.prepareStatement ("Update Employee - Iiiformation" 
+ " set Emg - Y)epartment=' @deptl where Emp - lD=@idl') ; 
ps . setInt (2, Emp - ID) ; 
ps . set~tring (1, Emp - Department) ; 
ps . executeupdate ( )  ; 
Figure 14 Java Code for execution of single CRUD Expression 
Figure 15 Policy Graph consisting of single node representing a State of the system 
4.1.2.2 Policy graph can have a node which has a loop fo ifself 
This access control rule is designed for scenarios where the execution of Business 
Schema is required in a loop. In this case the Update CRUD expression is called in the 
loop to assign the departments. This design of the access control policies addresses the 
scenario where the system remains in the same state until it completes required task as 
shown in Figure 17. Figure 16 shows a piece of java code where 
AssignDepartementEmployees() assigns the updates the table of information 
The loop structure is not an endless loop, as the node is defined as the terminating 
node of the Policy graph. In applications where the system remains in a particular state by 
executing the CRUD expression in a loop, restriction for not executing other CRUDs can 
imposed by using this structure. This rule restricts the system to loop through a state 
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public void AssignDepartuncn~loyoes (HashMapcInteger, String) EmpDepar) 
throws SQLException { 
Set set = EmpDepar . keySet () ; 
Iterator it = set .iterator ( )  ; 
while (it . has~ext () ) { 
PreparedStatement ps = co~.prepareStatement 
("Update Employee Information" 
- 
t " set Emp Department='@deptl where Emp ID=@idv'); 
- - 
int EmpID = (int) it .next ( )  ; 
ps . setInt (2, EmpID) ; 
ps . setString (1, Empilepar .get (EmpID) ) ; 
ps .executeUpdate () ; 
1 
1 
1 
Figure 16 Java code for the execution of the CRUD expression in a loop 
Figure 17 Policy Graph consisting of a node that has a loop to itself 
4.1.2.3 Policy Graph can have multiple terminating nodes 
A Policy Graph can have multiple terrninating nodes. Figure 19 show the example 
I where system can enter into one of the multiple states as the result of the execution one 
state, and these all can be regarded as terminating nodes. 
I 4.1.2.4 Moving from single node to multiple nodes is supported Figure 18 shows an example of Switch case statement where according to the age of the employee one of the various CRUD expressions is executed. This rule is designed 43 
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for scenarios where the execution of a CRUD expression can lead the system to one of 
the many possible states. Figure 19 shows the structure of the Policy graph for such 
scenarios. 
In the example shown in Figure 18 the selecf query for choosing the Emp-lD and 
Emp-Age is a state which leads the system into one of the many states. Therefore the 
system presents in swifch state enters into one of the many case statements state and 
performs the respected CRUD expression. 
public void AnalpzeTablesAccordingAge O throws SQLException { 
PreparedStatement ps; 
gs = conn.prepareStatement ("Select Emp - ID,Emp - Age irom Employee - lnformationl') ;
ResultSet rs = ps.executeQuery(); 
while (rs .next () ) 
{ int Emp - Age=rs . getInt ("Ernp - Age") ; 
int Emp - ID=~S .getint {"Emp - ID" ) ; 
irjwitch (Emp - Age) { 
case 55 : ps=conn .prepareStatement ("Update Employee - Inf ormation " 
t "set Salary=20001') ; 
break; 
case 60: ps=c~nn.prepareStatement('~Delete fron Working - Employees " 
+ "úuhere Emp - ID=@idl') ; 
ps. setInt (1, Emp - ID) ; 
break; 
case 30 : ps=conn. preparestatement ("Insert into Trsinee" 
t " (Emp - ID) values (@id)  " ) ; 
. ps.setInt (1, Emp - ID) ; 
break; 
def ault : 
ps=conn.prepareStatement ("Insert into ~etiredEmpioyee (Emp - ID) 'I) ; 
ps . setInt (1, Emp-ID) ; 
break; 
'1 
ps . executeupdate I) ; 
Figure 18 Java code for Figure 19 
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Figure 19 One state of the system leading to multiple states 
4.1.2.5 Moving fmm multiple nodes to a single node is supported 
Figure 21 shows an exarnple written in java explaining a scenario where rnultiple if, 
else if always ends up with a select query. In this exarnple execution of one of the if-else 
blocks will result into the execution of the one CRUD expression. 
This rule allows the security experts to design the policies where the execution of 
one of the rnultiple CRUD expression results into the execution of one and only one 
CRUD expressions. This rule addresses the scenanos where multiple states of the systern 
can lead to one of the one possible state as shown in Figure 21. 
Figure 20 Multiple state of system leading to one state 
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public void PerformCperation(String query, HashMapcString, String> parameters) 
throws SQLException i 
PreparedStatement ps = null; 
Set set = parameters.keySet(); 
Iterator it = set.iterator(); 
if (query.equals ("Insert") ) { 
ps = conn.prepareStatement ("Insert into Employee-Infcmation(Eq - Name, 'I 
+ ", Emp-Address)Values (I @nameu, '@addressC") ;
ps . setstring (1, parameters .get (it .next 0 ) ; 
ps . setString (2, parameters. get (it . next ( )  ) ) ; 
} else if (query .equals ("update") 1 I 
ps = conn.prepareStatement("Updòte Ernployee-Information set Errp - Address='@addressl"); 
ps.setString(1, parameters.get (it.next 0 )  ) ; 
) else if (query .equals ("Delete") ) { 
ps=conn.prepareStatement ("Delete * from Employee - Information where Ernp-I~=@id" ) ; 
ps.  setstring (1, (parameters. get (it .next O ) ) ) ; 
1 
ps .executeUpdate ()  ; 
ps = conn.prepareStatement (nSelect EmpName from Employee-~nformation") ; 
Resultset rs = ps.executeQuery(); 
while (rs . next () ) j 
System. out.println (llEmp-Name=l' + rs. getstring ("E3up - Name") ) ; 
!I 
Figure 21 One of the Multiple CRUD expression leads to single CRUD Expression 
4.1.2.6 Polícy graph restricted to single direction 
Some scenarios require more rigid policies where the client can only follow a certain 
path, for example trying to withdraw money from an account. This policy allows the 
system to enter into one and only one state as the result of execution of CRUD 
expression. 
Figure 22 shows java code to update the salary of an employee. In this example the 
execution of the update query depends on the result of the select query. The scenarios 
where the results of the execution of CRUD expressions of a state are used for the 
execution of CRUD expressions of the resulting state, access control policies must be 
designed to control order of the execution of state. Figure 23 shows the structure of the 
policy that can be designed to meet the scenario 
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public void 1JixlateSalary(int Emp ID) throws SQLException { 
PreparedStatement ps; 
ps = conn .prepareStatement ("Select Salary f rom 'I 
I 
I + "Employee - Salary where Emp - ID=@idw); 
i ps. setint (1, Emp ID) ; 1 - 
i ResultSet rs = ps.executeQuery(); 
i; 
int salary = rs .getInt (llSalary") ; 
if (salary > 1000) { 
1 salary = salary + 300; 
i 
i ps = conn.prepareStatement("Update Employee Salary " 
i - I + "set ~alary=@salary where Emp 1D=@id "); 
ps . setInt (1, salary) ; 
4 ps. setInt (2, ~ m p  ID) ; 
- L j ,exe-e<i 3 1  . , , . - .  . < . I .  . I 
. - 
i i 
Figure 22 Moving from one state to another in Single Direction 
Figure 23 Execution following a single direction 
By applying the above mentioned niles to the design of the access control policies 
security experts can design the policies to map the execution of the database driven 
applications to the structure of the access control policies. 
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4.1.3 Inter Graph Execution 
This model supports the feature of halting the execution of an ongoing Policy Graph 
and starting a new authorized Policy Graph, and this is regarded as Inter graph 
communication. Popular programming languages supports method calling, which makes 
the piece of code inside that method reusable. Current Model uses this concept and 
supports the concept of reusing the policy graphs. 
In Policy graphs The Policy graph whose execution is halted is regarded as 
Parent-Graph and the one whose execution is started as the result of halting is called 
Child-Graph. The rules that should be followed while implementing the Inter Graph 
communication are: 
Child-Graph's execution starts at the root node 
Only a halt node can cal1 the Policy graphs which it is authorised to call. 
After the successful execution of the terminating node of the Child-Graph, system 
enters into the state in which the Parent-Graph was halted and based on the 
outgoing edges of the halt node the decision of the next Business Schema to be 
executed is made. 
Figure 24 shows the block diagram where the Policy graph that has the halt node 
can request one of the many policy graphs that the halt node has authorization to call. 
Designing a graph where halt nodes are supported is a powerful feature as it allows the 
security experts to use the policies in different scenarios. But the security expert must take 
into consideration while designing the policy that by providing a halt node he gives the 
user a freedom to execute a different graph without finishing the current Policy graph. The 
security experts should consider before providing a privilege to the design. 
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Figure 24 Inter- Graph execution Block diagram 
Policy Graph 2 
4.1.3.1 State Diagram explaining the Inter-Graph Execution 
For better understanding of the application of the rules a state diagram is presented 
in Figure 25. The state diagram representation used for representing the inter graph 
execution is based on Harel's model( David HAREL, 1987) .The diagram shown in Figure 
25 contains six states named as A. B, C, Y, 2, ff 'TN' stands for the terminating node in 
the figure. 
Policy Graphl 
Policy Graph 3 
A is the default state for Policy Graphl and B is the default state for Policy Graph2. 
The state H represents the most recent visited state of the system. Root node is marked 
with an incoming amw carrying a dot which represents the default state of the systems. 
Whenever a CRUD expression of a Business Scherna is executed the system enters into 
a new state. Returning back to the Horne-Graph depends on the most recent visited state 
of the system. Suppose Policy Graph2 was visited from state Y, then most recent visited 
state of Policy Graphl will be Y and the decision of the next Business schema is made 
based on the state the system is in. Numbering in the Figure 25 indicates a possible path 
that is being used for validating user's actions. 
............ 
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Figure 25 : state diagram representing the application of predefined policies 
4.2 Proof of concept 
This section provides a proof of concept for the Access Control Model defined by 
this thesis work. To implement the presented access control model S-DRACA is chosen 
as the base of this work and RBAC models has been chosen as the reference model for 
authenticating the clients. This section will bring light on the implementation of the 
Orchestration of CRUD expressions, configuration of the Policy graphs and their utilization 
for validating the actions of the user. This section also explains the modular structure 
which is inherited from S-DRACA, the changes made to the inherited components for 
supporting Policy graphs and the implementation of the presented Access Control Model 
using S-DRACA and RBAC. 
4.2.1 Block Diagram of the Access Control Model 
This section describes the behaviour of the various components that are inherited 
from S-DRACA and the changes that are made to these components for supporting the 
presented Access Control Model. 
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Current model inherits the modular structure of the S-DRACA but changes the 
implementation of some of the components to support the access contml policies which 
are now designed as graph structures. S-DRACA provided the security layer which 
provided the features of authentication and encryptions. In this work the security layer 
which is provided by S-DRACA is not altered by any means. 
The problem address with this work is freedom that a user can have after he is 
authenticated to access a resource. To provide a solution to the pmblem RBAC model 
has been chosen as a reference model. Figure 26 shows the block diagram where the 
different components that are inherited from S-DRACA are shown. 
Access control policies are stored in the Policy Server which is a relational database 
and holds the access control policies in the form of relational tables. The client connects 
to the Policy Manager and he is authenticated by the access control model that is 
deployed on the server side. In current implementation the client is authenticated on the 
bases of RBAC model. After the authentication of the client, Policy Manager gets the 
authorized policies which are stored in the policy server and generates the Policy graphs. 
The Policy graph is then sent to the Policy extractor, and Policy extractor generates the 
interfaces for the Business Schemas. 
Figure 26 Block Diagram representing the work flow of Presented work 
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At run time the Business Manager request the Policy graphs from the Policy 
Manager and also implements the interfaces generated by the Policy extractor. The client 
requests the next Business schema to be executed from the Business Manager. If the 
client tries to execute a Business Schema which is not allowed to be executed then 
Business Manger throws an exception based on the policy graph. The Policy manager 
relays the communication of the Business Manager and the Policy server. 
In current implementation Business Manger holds another component Flexible 
Sequence Manger. This component allows the inter-graph execution and the validation of 
the client operations in regards to the Policy graph it has. The implementation of the 
modified components is shown in section 4.2.3. 
4.2.2 CRUD Orchestration 
The word Orchestrate means organizing or arranging something via a planned and 
clever way. Orchestration of the CRUD expression in presented work means arranging 
the CRUD expression in the form of directed graph that can be used by an entity on the 
client side for providing the service of validating the execution of the CRUD expressions of 
the client and generating the interíaces for the execution of the authorized CRUD 
expressions. 
In presented Access Control model the access control policies are stored in the 
relational database in the form of tables. These policies are being requested by the 
Business Manager and it provides the Clients with the interface to execute the Business 
Schema. 
In reference to this work Orchestration of the CRUD expressions is obtained by 
implementing an entity "Flexible Sequence Manager (FSM)" for providing the service of 
validating the execution of CRUD expressions of the client in regard to the policy graph it 
has. FSM is a part of the Business Manager and it's the Business Manger that requests 
the policy graph from the Policy Manager on behave of the client application. 
FSM maintains a stack of active graphs, based on the graphs which are pushed 
into the stack client's execution of CRUD expressions is validated. The reason for using a 
stack to store the order of active graphs is to support the rule defined by Inter-Graph 
Communication in section 4.1.3. 
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Whenever client application requests the execution of a new policy graph, FSM 
performs the following operation: 
1. It pops the policy graph which is on top of the stack of active graphs. 
2. Checks if the current node that is executed to validate the execution of 
CRUD expression is a halt or terminating node. 
3. If it is a halt node then it checks if the requested Policy graph can be 
executed from this node or not. If both conditions holds true then it pushes 
back the current Policy graph into the stack of active graphs, push the new 
Policy graph into the stack and start the execution of the requested new 
Policy graph by executing the root node. 
4. If it is a terminating node with outgoing edges then it push back the current 
Policy graph into the stack, push the new Policy graph into the stack and 
start the execution of the requested new Policy graph by executing the root 
node. 
5. If it is not a halt or terminating node then it throws an exception for the 
client, as he is not authorized to request the execution of the new Policy 
graph at this point. 
Client's execution of CRUD expressions is validated by the FSM using the Policy 
graph. When the client requests for the next Business Schema, FSM performs the 
following operations: 
1. It peeks at the top of the stack of active graphs and checks if the requested 
Business Schema belong to the graph present on top of the stack 
2. If it is a part of the graph present on top of the stack, then FSM pops the 
graph and check if the currently executed node has a directed edge to the 
node of the requested Business Schema and the source of the direct edge 
is the currently executed node. If both of the conditions holds true then it 
validates the execution of the CRUD expressions belonging to that 
schema. 
3. If it is not the part of the graph present on top of stack of active graphs then 
it performs the check for the execution of the new Policy graph. 
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The irnplernentation of the stack of active graphs is shown in section 
FSM acts like a central repository which authenticates the execution of the next 
authorized business scherna. Figure 27 shows the entire structure for the CRUD 
orchestration: 
I. Retrieving stored policies from the Policy server 
2. Sending policies as objects containing the Policy graphs for authorized user 
3. Authenticating next CRUD expressions to be executed 
4. Result of CRUD execution from the client to the Policy manager and response of the 
Policy Manager. 
Policy 
Server 
- - 
Client 
Figure 27 Orch.e&raSion o$ CRUD expressions 
4.2.3 Implementation of the Access Control Model using S-DRACA and RBAC 
This section explains the implementation of the access control policies, how they are 
being sent to the Business Manager and Policy Extractor, the generation of the interfaces 
using annotation and reflections, how Business Manager provides the validation of CRUD 
expression and provide the next Business Schema interface to the client for execution of 
CRUD expressions. 
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4.2.3.1 Implementing the Access Contml Policies 
Design of the security policies to control the execution of CRUD expressions 
allocated for the role is done by a security manager who wnsiders the fact that RBAC 
model is chosen as a reference model. These policies are stored in the databases and 
when a client connects to the server, these policies are being sent by the Policy Manager 
to the Business Manager and Policy Extrador. 
Providing flexibility for designing these policies was one of the most challenging 
tasks faced in the completion of this work. In database applications users are not 
restricted to execute a unidirected sequence of business schemas but it's the execution 
of the business schema that takes the system to a state where user can execute one of 
many business schemas or execute a single schema. Figure 28 shows the ent i i  
relationship diagram describing how the policies are stored in the database. 
1 Burlb (PK) I 
Figure 28 Entity Relationship Diagram for different tables for the Policy Graph 
For current work policies are stored in Policy Server which is a relational database. 
Policy Configurator is a module inherited from S-DRACA which acts as a security expert 
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for designing the access control policies and storing them into the database. It inserts the 
policies into the database by using SQL queries. Figure 31 shows an SQL table for storing 
the nodes of the different graphs that are present in table shown by Figure 29. 
-- 
GmphlD Descriptíon 
............................. 
~ - - - -  
1 $ 1  1 Gmphl 
........................... . 
2 2 Eiraph2 
3 3 
- - Grapk3 
Figure 29 SQL table for storing the Policy Graph description 
Figure 30 shows the SQL queries for inserting the names and the nodes tnat a 
policy graph have into the table. After the values are inserted into these tables, Policy 
Configurator needs to formulate the design of the access control policy by inserting the 
edge information of the nodes of the graphs, specifying the root nodeslnode of the graph, 
specifying the terminating nodelnodes of the graph and providing the information about 
the halt nodelnodes. 
pstmt = conn . prepares-cazen!& ( 
"INSERT INTO PolicyGraphs (GraphID, ~escription) " 
+ "OALUES (4, "riiph4 ' ) ") ; 
pstmt.executeUpdate(); 
pstmt = .- - conn.pr&pareStat&ment( . 
'I IINSERT INTO BS - GraphNodes ( S e q I D ,  NodeID, RefBusID) " 
+ "VALUES (1, 1, (SELECT Bus - id FROM Bus - BusinessSc'hema " 
+ "WHERE Busurl = 9 - ~ustomers.IS Customers'))"); 
pçtmt . executeupdate O ; 
Figure 30 SQL queries to insert values in the tables shown in Figure 31 and Figure 29 
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Figure 31 : SQL table for all the nodes of the Graphs of Figure 29 
The connection between the nodes of the graph is shown by the table Figure 32. 
This table provides the information of the directed edge by regarding the nodes as parent 
node and child node. The source of the edge is the parent and target is the child. 
Figure 32 SQL table specify the parent and child nodes of different graphs 
As there can be more than one halt, terminating and root nodes, therefore three 
difíerent tables are created in which the respected information is provided. Figure 33 
shows the table where the root node of the various graphs is inserted. 
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Figure 33 SQL table for the root nodes of different graphs 
Figure 34 SQL table for halt nodes 
Figure 34 shows an SQL table for the halt nodes. The column AllowedChildGraphlD 
specifies which graphs can be requested from this node. To implement Inter-Graph 
Execution the permission of requesting the new Policy graph is implemented on node 
level rather than Graph level. The reason for doing this is to provide the security expert 
with the too1 that he can design the policies where the user can only start inter-graph 
execution on specific nodes. If the permission to start the inter-graph execution is 
provided at graph level then user can be at any node in the graph and can request the 
new policy graph, and this can be avoided if needed. 
The terminating nodes information is given by the table shown in Figure 35. 
Terminating nodes indicates that the execution of the Policy Graph has ended based on 
the policies defined in section 4.1 
Figure 35 SQL table for terminating nodes 
To implement these policies, graphs are considered to be the basic structure. 
Authorizing the path that a user can follow to accomplish a task is done by creating the 
directed graph structures where the nodes cany the following information: 
The business schema that can be executed on that node 
ID of the node in that particular graph 
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If the node is a terminating node or not 
If the node is a root node or not 
The IDs of the other Policy graphs whose execution can be requested after 
the execution of the Business Schema of this node (if it is a halt node). 
The list of the Business Schemas that are revoked for this node 
List of IDs of the nodes that are child of this node (edges) 
Figure 36 shows the structure of the class Node-lnfo. The nodes of the Policy graph are 
of type Nod~lnfo.  Policy manager gets the policies from the Policy server and then 
creates directed graphs which are regarded as Policy graphs. 
public c lass  IodcInfo { 
public Integer nodeID; 
public S t r ing  BSurl; 
public Lis t<~nteger>  edges = new ArrayList<> ()  ; 
public List<String> revokelist  = new ArrayList<> () ; 
public boolean isRootNode = false; 
public List<String> haltNodeCallable = new ArrayListO () ; 
public boolean isTentinatingNode = false;  
Figure 36 Java code implementing the class Node-lnfo 
Policy manager is the only entity in the project that communicates directly to the 
Policy Server, the requests from the Business Manager and Policy Extractor for getting 
the stored access control policies are handled by Policy Manager. The result of the 
execution of the Business Schema from the clients is mediated by the Policy Manager to 
the underlying database. 
As the policies are now graph structure therefore the Policy Manager is modified to 
support the change in structure of the policies. Policy Manager gets the policies which are 
stored in the Policy Server by using the SQL queries. Policy Manager creates the graphs 
that are authorized for a particular role. 
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After this information is retrieved from the database the Policy Manager creates the 
Policy graph. Figure 37 shows the java code which for creating the structure of the Policy 
Graph. Nodes of the graph are of type Node-lnfo which is a class shown in Figure 36. 
Preparedstatement pstmt = conn.prepareStatement 
(Select- Sequerices ID - Position - BusUrl - By - RoleReference) ; 
pstmt . setstring (1, role) ; 
ResultSet rs = pstmt.executeQuery0; 
while (rs.next ( )  ) { 
int seq = rs . getInt (1) ; 
int nodeN = rs . getInt (2) ; 
String beurl = rs . getstring (3) ; 
pstmt = conn.prepareStatement(Select - Edges Of - NodeID); 
pstmt. setInt (1, çeq) ; 
pstmt.setInt (2, nodeN) ; 
ResultSet edgesRS = pstmt.executeQuery(); 
List<String> revokelist = getRevokeListIseq, nodeN); 
if (!sequences.contains~ey[seq)) { 
sequences .put (seq, new HashMap<> ( )  ) ;I 1 
MapcInteger, NodeInfo> seqdata = sequences . get (seq) ; 
ArrayList<Integer> edges = new ArrayList<>(); 
while ledgesRS . next () ) { 
edges.add(edgesRS.getInt (1)); 
I 
NodeInf o ni = new NodeInfo (nodeN, beurl, edges, revokelist) ; 
ni . isRoo tNode = isRoo t (seq, nodeN) ; 
ni.haltNodeCallable= qetNodeCallable(seq,nodeN); 
ni . is~erminatingNode=is~eminatingNode (seq, nodeN) ; 
seqdata .put (nodeN, ni) ; 
Figure 37 Java code for getting the graphs for each Role 
At compile time Policy Extractor requests for the policies from the Policy Manager 
and Policy Manager responds to the request of the Policy Extractor by writing the 
structure of the Policy Graph using PrintWriter. Figure 38 shows java code, where the 
Policy Manager writes the information regarding the Policy Graph using PrintWriter object. 
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Map<Integer, MapcInteger, NodeInfo>> sequences = & 
I- 
.getSequenceInfoForRole (inputFields [l] ) ; 
for (int seqID : sequences. keySet ( )  ) { 
MapcInteger , NodeInfo> sequence = sequences . get (seqID) ; 
for (int nodeID : sequence. keySet () ) { 
System. out.println (String. format ("node 8d %d %s", 
seqID, nodeID, sequence. get (nodeID) . BSurl) ) ; 
out .println(String. format ("%d 8d \sw, 
seqID, nodeID, sequence. get (nodeID) . BSurl) ) ; 
out . flush () ; 
Figure 38 Java code of Policy Manger's reply to Policy Configurator 
4.2.3.2 Extraction and Application of Access Conúal Policies 
Policy Extraction: 
Policy Extractor sends message to Policy Manager requesting the list of access 
contml policies and according to these policies interfaces are generated at compile time 
by the policy annotations. Java reflection and annotations are being used to generate the 
interfaces. This part is inherited fmm S-DRACA. 
As policies are designed in the form of graph stn~dures, the Policy Extractor is now 
modified to support these structures. It sends a request to the Policy manager requesting 
the infomation about the policies and receives the policies in the form of strings as shown 
in Figure 38. 
As Policy Extractor get the reply from the Policy Manger, it starts to reconstnict the 
Policy graph using the replies. A custom message protocol ensures that the data sent is 
correctly interpreted on the Policy Extractor sides, and the same adheres on the Policy 
Manager side. Figure 38 shows the java code for the creating the Policy graph from the 
replies of the Policy Manager. 
After the policy graph is reconstructed the interfaces for the Business Manager can 
now be generated by using the java annotation processar and the java reflection. Figure 
40 shows the rnethod which is being used to generate the interfaces for the Business 
Manager. The StringBuilder object is being used to constnict the interface by appending 
the information about the business schema of the node, its child nodes etc. 
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out.println("getSeqInfo " + role) ; 
out . f lush () ; 
~tring line; 
while ( ! (line = in. readLine O ) . equalsIgnoreCase (''END") ) { 
string [ I  resp = line. split ("  [ I ")  ;I 
if (resp-length >= 4) { 
Integer seq = Integer . parsernt (resp [O] ) ; 
Integer nodeID = Integer.parseInt(resp[l]); 
Integer edge = Integer .parseInt (resp [2] ) ; 
if ( ! orqinf o. containsKey (seq) ) { 
orqinfo .put (seq, new HashMapo () ) ; 
1 
Map<Integer, NodeInfo> seqdata = orqinfo .get (seq) ; 
if ( ! seqdata . containsHey(nodeID) ) { 
HodeInfo nodeInfo = new NodeInfo(node1D) ; 
nodeInfo. BSurl  = "BSerrorURLQ1; 
' I  
nodeInfo.edges.add(edge); 
seqdata .put (nodeID, nodeInf o) ; 
) else { 
seqdata . get (nodeID) . edges . add (edge) ; 
1 
1 +.-i.-.- r 
Figure 39 Java code to create Policy Graph from the Policy Manager's reply 
private static void generateNextMethods(StringBui1der strb, Class c, 
Map<Integer, kap<1nteger, NodeInfo>> orqinfo) { 
String beurl = c. getpackage () . getName () t I' . 'I + c. getSimpleName () ; 
for (Integer seq : orqinfo.keySet ( ) )  { 
for (Integer nodeID : orqinfo .get (seq) . keySet () ) { 
String gotbeurl = orqinfo . get (seq) . get (nodeID) , BSurl; 
if lgotbeurl.e~alialsIgnoreCas~eurl)) {I
strb. append("// : " t orqinfo.get (seq) .get (nodeID) t "\n"); 
for (Integer edgeID : orqinfo. get (seq) .get (nodeID) . edges) { 
strb.append(" public " )  ; 
strb.append (orqinfo.get (seq) .get (edgeID) .BSurl) .append(" "1 ; 
strb.append ("nextBE - G " )  . append(seq) . append (" - edge") .append (edgeID) ; 
strb. append (I' (iiit crud, ISessioii session) throvs LocalTocls . BTC ~xception; \nT1) ;
Figure 40 Method to generate Interfaces for Business Manager 
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Policy Application 
Business Manager irnplements the interfaces which are generated by the Policy In- 
terface generator and provides the client application with the interfaces where the client 
can execute the authorized Business Schemas. The Business Managers holds another 
module knows as FSM, it is being used to enforce the rules of the presented access con- 
trol rnodel. 
Business Manager has been rnodified to support the validation based on a Policy 
graph. Business Manager's module FSM períorrns the validation of the CRUD expression 
that the client is trying to execute by requesting a Business Schema. If the client is not 
allowed to the CRUD expression it throws an exception. It's the FSM that enforces the 
rules defined by the presented Access Control Model. 
public void updaWivmBE8 (Map<Integer, List<NodeInfo>> runningseqs, String beUrl) ( 
for (Integer seq : runningSeqs.keySet 0) { 
if ( ! runningseqs .get (seq) .get (1astExecutedNode) . isEndNode () ) ( 
for (Integer nextEdge : runningseqs . get (seq) . get (1astExecutedNode) . edges) { 
String edgeBS = getBus (runningseqs . get (seq) . get (nextEdge) ) ; 
i setAuthorizedBS (edgeBS) ; 
~ist<~tring> values = getRevokeList (runningseqs. get (seq) . get (nextEdge) ) ; h g B S  e ( r  1 
. . 1 i besalive .removeAil (values) ; 
1 
besalive. add (beUrl) ; 
1 
Figure 41 Java code for the management of Validation of next Business Schema 
Figure 41 shows the function which is called when the user request for the next 
Business Scherna. This function checks if the last executed node is not an End Node (a 
node having no outgoing edges or just a loop to itself) then it gets its outgoing nodes and 
puts the target nodes Business Schemas into the list of alive Business schemas. 
The validation of a Business Schema execution is done when the client executes 
the requested Business Schema. If a client is executing the business scherna of a halt 
node then the callable sequence's root nodes' business schernas are inserted into the 
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branches of the active sequence along with the business schemas of the outgoing edges 
it has with the current executed node. If the next business schema executed by the client 
is the business schema of a callable sequence then this callable sequence is pushed onto 
the stack of active sequences. Following the node after the halt node of the same policy 
graph makes the previously added policy graphs to be removed from the current branches 
of the active sequence. In case of a terminating node, where it was requested a next 
business schema ( in case there are any outgoing edges) then the branches of the active 
sequence is filled with the Business Schema of its target nodes. 
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5 Conclusion and Future directions 
An atternpt to bring flexibility in the designing of the security policies for controlling the 
execution of the CRUD expressions has been made. The introduction of the FSM allows 
providing the orchestration of the CRUD expressions. Security rnanagers can design the 
policies that can be applied in rnany areas of business world based on the mles defined 
for the support of this rnodel. The decision of forrnalizing the mles supported by this rnodel 
is based on the real world needs and demands. This rnodel can be used to track the path 
that a user follows as the FSM wrnponent knows what the client is executing. This feature 
can be applied to many scenarios such as to know on which level majority of users get 
stuck while playing a garne and hence the analysts can use this informatiqn to know that 
where the problern is, in the design of the game. 
, I # I  r, 
.I ' L 
Currently the exchange of inforrnation between the Policy Manager, Policy Extractor 
and Business Manager is done by writing the data onto the output and input strearns. This 
information exchange can only be possible if there is an agreernent to use a specific 
message format. In future work this can be modified by using objects for sending and 
receiving data. 
I 1:u' 
The Security Configumtor is a file which is manually written to enter the pol'ides'fnto 
the database. This cornponent can be upgraded so that the security rnanager does not 
have to write the access control policies one by one. In current structure if need to rnodify 
a specific access control policy we need to run the Security Configurator all over againt~ 
change the policy in the database, this can be avoided. 
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